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Abstract
Background: A recent Lancet article reported the first reliable estimates of suicide rates in India. National-level
suicide rates are among the highest in the world, but suicide rates vary sharply between states and the causes of
these differences are disputed. We test whether differences in the structure of agricultural production explain
inter-state variation in suicides rates. This hypothesis is supported by a large number of qualitative studies, which
argue that the liberalization of the agricultural sector in the early-1990s led to an agrarian crisis and that consequently
farmers with certain socioeconomic characteristics–cash crops cultivators, with marginal landholdings, and debts–are at
particular risk of committing suicide. The recent Lancet study, however, contends that there is no evidence to support
this hypothesis.
Methods: We report scatter diagrams and linear regression models that combine the new state-level suicide rate
estimates and the proportion of marginal farmers, cash crop cultivation, and indebted farmers.
Results: When we include all variables in the regression equation there is a significant positive relationship between
the percentage of marginal farmers, cash crop production, and indebted farmers, and suicide rates. This model
accounts for almost 75% of inter-state variation in suicide rates. If the proportion of marginal farmers, cash crops, or
indebted farmers were reduced by 1%, the suicide rate–suicides per 100,000 per year–would fall by 0·437, 0·518 or
0·549 respectively, when all other variables are held constant.
Conclusions: Even if the Indian state is unable to enact land reforms due to the power of local elites, interventions to
stabilize the price of cash crops and relieve indebted farmers may be effective at reducing suicide rates.
Keywords: Farmers’ suicides, Agrarian crisis, India, Marginal farmers, Cash crops, Indebtedness
Background
The Lancet recently published an article by Vikram Patel
and his collaborators that used a nationally representative
mortality survey of 1·1 million households to provide the
first accurate estimates of deaths from suicide in India [1].
This important study revealed the magnitude of suicide as
a public health problem. In 2010 187,000 people died from
suicide in India–this amounts to one fifth of all suicides in
the world [1,2]. Indian suicide rates–26·3 for men and
17·5 for women–are among the highest in the world
[1-3]. Suicide is the second leading cause of death among
young adults in India–after road accidents for men and
maternity-related complications for women [1].
Patel et al.’s study demonstrated that suicide in India
is a very different social phenomenon to suicide in high-
income countries (HICs): suicide rates in rural areas are
almost double those in urban areas, whereas in HICs
there is little difference; suicide rates in India are highest
in wealthier regions, which challenges findings in HICs;
the most common method of suicide in India–the in-
gestion of pesticides–is rarely seen in HICs; and unlike
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higher among elderly people [2]. Consequently, as India
undergoes the epidemiological transition and starts to
turn its attention from infectious diseases to issues such
as suicide prevention it cannot rely on approaches that
have been successful elsewhere.
Patel et al. show that there is substantial geographical
variation in suicides rates within India [1]. Suicide rates
in some states are more than ten times those in others.
Kerala, which is often presented as a model of success in
terms of public health and human development, has the
highest male suicide rate [4]. Indeed, if Kerala was a
country its male suicide rate (66· 3) would be the highest
in the world–a position currently held by Lithuania (61·3)
[1,5]. Bihar, on the other hand, which is one of the least
developed states in India, has the lowest male suicide rate
(6·3). This inter-state variation is a puzzle that has yet
to be resolved by public health researchers. But it also
provides us with an opportunity because, if we can
understand why these differences occur, it is possible to
infer lessons, guide public policy, and ultimately reduce
suicide rates.
The Lancet study notes: “Most public attention [on
suicide] in India has focused on suicide in farmers” [1].
A significant number of ethnographies, case studies,
government reports, and newspaper articles claim that
the opening of markets and scaling back of state support
that followed the liberalization of the Indian economy in
the early-1990s led to an “agrarian crisis” and an increase
in farmers’ suicides ([6-8]; see Appendix for a summary of
literature). So-called “marginal farmers” with landholdings
of less that one hectare, who cultivate capital-intensive
cash crops that are subject to price fluctuations, such as
coffee and cotton, are most likely to have debts that they
are unable to pay back, and are, therefore, at greater risk
of committing suicide. This research concentrates on
states that have some of the highest suicide rates in the
country–such as Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka and
Maharashtra. Thus, when taken as a whole this body of re-
search suggests that inter-state variation in suicide rates
can, at least to some extent, be explained by the character-
istics of the rural political economy.
Some of Patel et al.’s findings–for example, that suicide
rates are twice as high in rural areas compared to urban
areas and that ingestion of pesticides accounts for al-
most half of all suicides–would seem to confirm the
farmers’ suicide thesis. Nevertheless, they state: “our
findings do not suggest that suicide is any more preva-
lent in agricultural workers (including farmers) than it is
in any other profession” [1]. This finding received inter-
national media attention: for example, it was featured in
an article on the BBC news website that was titled “In-
dian farmers and suicide: How big is the problem?” [9].
How can we explain the fact that Patel’s et al. national-
level quantitative analysis apparently contradicts such a
large number of case studies and anecdotal accounts?
There is a tendency to view large-N statistical research as
more reliable than narrowly focussed qualitative analyses,
particularly in medical sciences. To some extent this as-
sumption is reasonable. As with any case study, these ana-
lyses select on the dependent variable. In other words, they
attempt to understand farmers’ suicides by focusing on an
area that is affected by this phenomenon. It is not possible
to generalize from this body of research because it is plaus-
ible that there are other areas with similar political and
economic conditions that are not affected by farmers’ sui-
cides and therefore not studied. Consequently, it would be
easy to conclude that Patel et al.’s study falsifies a widely
cited “pseudo fact” established by unreliable case study
data and that the issue of farmers’ suicides is merely a
“pseudo problem” [10].
The Lancet study does not, however, correctly opera-
tionalize the mechanism that many case studies identify
as linking farmers to increased suicide rates [1]. Patel
et al. reach their conclusion by comparing the primary
occupations of those people who committed suicide,
noting that while agricultural workers accounted for
30% of suicides, non-workers and others (salaried, pro-
fessional and other jobs) accounted for 33% and 38%
respectively.
This is problematic on two main counts. Firstly, it
reifies the occupational structure of rural India because
in social reality there is not a neat separation between
agricultural workers, non-workers, and others. Case stud-
ies demonstrate that, before they commit suicide, many
struggling farmers undertake wage labour to supplement
their meagre income or quit cultivation altogether to
begin another occupation [8]. If their income from
non-agricultural activities exceeds their income from
farming–which is highly likely in a period of agrarian
crisis–they would not be classified as a farmer in Patel
et al.’s study [1]. Nevertheless, if such an ex-farmer
committed suicide, one would have a very strong case
for arguing that this should be classified as a “farmer’s
suicide”. Secondly, case studies of farmers’ suicides do
not argue that the phenomenon accounts for all suicides
or that it affects all farmers. Rather, they claim that
farmers with certain socioeconomic characteristics–those
with marginal landholdings, who cultivate cash crops and
are indebted–are at particular risk of committing suicide.
Patel et al. do not have the data to test this proposition
and are only able to correlate suicide with occupation, as
well as other general characteristics such gender, educa-
tion, geographical region, and marital status [1].
Methods
This study combines Patel et al.’s state-level suicide rates
with other variables to investigate whether the findings
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eralized to the whole of India. More specifically, we test
the hypothesis that suicide rates will be higher in states
where there are more marginal farmers, where more
cash crops are grown, and where there are more in-
debted farmers. To the best of our knowledge, which is
based on systematic searches of PubMed and Web of
the Knowledge, and with the notable exception of Patel
et al.’s paper, this is the first study to analyse India-wide
quantitative data to investigate whether the findings of
qualitative studies of farmers’ suicides are generalizable.
Following Patel et al., we divide India into 18 units:
the seventeen largest states, including undivided Bihar,
Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, as well as a combined
unit for the smaller north-eastern states that comprises
Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram,
Tripura, and Meghalaya.
The dependent variable is the age standardized male
suicide mortality rate (suicides per 100,000 per year).
Patel et al.’s figures are based on data collected between
2001 and 2003–although they are adjusted to give esti-
mates for 2010. The data comes from a nationally repre-
sentative mortality survey designed to determine the
cause of deaths in 1· 1 million homes in 6,671 randomly
selected small areas. Patel et al.’s estimates (μ=26.1) are
considerably higher than the official and annually enu-
merated National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) figures
(μ=15 ·5). This disparity can be explained by the fact
that the latter are compiled from local police reports
and suicide is illegal–as well as heavily stigmatised–in
India [11]. Nevertheless, there is a very strong correlation
between the two figures (r=0·950, p<0·001). For our
dependent variable we use NCRB figures and adjust for
under- or over-reporting using Patel et al.’se s t i m a t e s .
The proportion of marginal farmers–farming house-
holds with a landholding of less than one hectare–was
recorded by the Ministry of Agriculture’s quinquennial
“Agricultural Census of India” in 2000–01 and 2005–06
[12]. There was only a small difference between the fig-
ures in the two surveys, with the proportion of marginal
farmers tending to increase slightly (mean =1 ·5%) over
the period. To estimate annual figures we interpolate
between the two data points.
To operationalize cash crops, we use the proportion of
land that is used to cultivate “non-food crops”, according
to Ministry of Agriculture’s annual “Land Use Statistics
at a Glance” [13]. This category comprises oil seeds, fibres,
dyes, tanning materials, drugs, narcotics and plantations
crops, and includes commodities such as cotton and
coffee that have been identified by ethnographic research
as being associated with farmers’suicides.
Both the “Agricultural Census” and “Land Use Statistics”
are compiled by the Directorate of Economics and Statis-
tics of the Ministry of Agriculture using a combination of
land ownership records where they exist (in 87% of India)
and household inquiry in the remaining areas (13%)–
north-eastern states, West Bengal, Kerala, Orissa. Bihar
figures for marginal farmers do not include Jharkhand and
northeastern figures do not include Meghalaya.
Data on farmers’ indebtedness has only been collected
once, by the National Sample Survey Organization’s
“Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers” in 2003 [14].
The sample included 51,770 households in 6,638 villages.
The definition of an indebted farming household is: “if it
had any loan in cash or kind and its value at the time of
transaction was 300 rupees [$5] or more” [14]. While
this is a relatively small amount of money by Western
standards, we should bear in mind that the Planning
Commission recently stated that 25 rupees ($0.4) a day
is an “adequate” daily income in rural India [15]. In our
time-series analysis we assume that the proportion of
indebted farmers is stable for the two years before and
after 2003. In reality we would expect some level of vari-
ation over this period. Nevertheless, as the political and
economic shocks that brought about the agrarian crisis
and mass indebtedness occurred in the early- and mid-
1990s, we would not expect to see significant changes
over this period [7-9].
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and Table 2 is a
correlation matrix.
In the next section we investigate the relationship be-
tween these variables–first using scatter plots and second
with linear regressions.
Results and discussion
First, we report three scatter plots that combine NCRB
suicide figures adjusted for under- or over-reporting
using Patel et al.’s estimates with each independent
variable.
The relationship between the proportion of marginal far-
mers and suicide rates is not particularly clear (r =0 ·241,
p = 0 ·378) (Figure 1). The three states with the highest
suicide rates–Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh–
have some of the highest proportions of marginal farmers
and other states–Punjab, Gujarat, and Rajasthan–have
both a low proportion of marginal farmers and among
the lowest suicide rates. Nevertheless, there is a cluster of
states on the bottom right of the scatter plot–Bihar, Jammu
and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, the north-
eastern states, and Assam–which have a high percentage
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of main variables
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Suicide rate 90 23·5 17·3 2·1 77·0
Marginal farmers % 90 58·9 21·3 12·3 95·5
Cash crops % 90 23·5 15·4 3·2 58·1
Indebted farmers % 90 50·4 15·8 18·1 82·0
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not fit into this pattern. It is apparent from Figures 2 and
3 respectively that this cluster of states also has the lowest
proportion of both cash crops and indebtedness in India.
This suggests that the percentage of marginal farmers is
only associated with higher suicide rates in states where
farmers are subject to the vulnerability of cash crop culti-
vation and indebtedness. West Bengal is another outlier,
with a relatively high proportion of marginal farmers but a
suicide rate only just above the mean. This anomaly might
be explained by strength of the Communist Party of India
(Marxist) in the state over the past 35 years and, in
particular, their unrivalled commitment to improve the
hitherto precarious position of marginal farmers [16].
Figure 2 shows there is a clear association between the
proportion of cash crops and the suicide rate (r=0 ·628,
p= 0· 005). The two anomalies are Gujarat and to a
lesser extent Rajasthan, which have high levels of cash
crops and low suicide rates. Nevertheless, they both have
among the lowest proportion of marginal farmers (see
Figure 1). Gujarat and Rajasthan’s relatively low suicide
rates might be explained by the fact that in these states
cash crops tend to be cultivated by farmers with relatively
large landholdings and the resources to endure difficult
periods without suffering from the same economic prob-
lems as marginal farmers.
Figure 3 shows there is a clear association between the
percentage of indebted farmers and suicide rates (r= 0·
729, p=0·018). With a high proportion of indebted
farmers but low suicide rate, Punjab, is an outlier. Figure 1
demonstrates that Punjab has by far the lowest proportion
of marginal farmers. This indicates that indebtedness is
less likely to lead to suicide where farmers have larger
landholdings, more resources, and therefore a greater abil-
ity to endure difficult periods.
The scatter plots demonstrate that high levels of mar-
ginal farmers, cash crops production and indebted farmers
are not, on their own, sufficient conditions for high levels
of suicide. Nevertheless, there is a clear positive associ-
ation between the proportion of both cash crops grown
and indebted farmers and suicide rates and, while the as-
sociation between the proportion of marginal farmers and
suicide rates is not so clear, we would expect it to become
significant when we control for either or both cash crops
and indebtedness.
The results of pooled linear regressions using data for
the period 2001–05 are shown in Table 3. We report the
regression coefficient and in parentheses we specify robust
standard errors clustered by state to account for the non-
independence of observations from the same state.
T h er e s u l t sa r ei nl i n ew i t hw h a tw ew o u l de x p e c t
from analysing the scatter plots. The proportion of mar-
ginal farmers is not significantly related to suicide rates
but the sign of the coefficient is positive (model 1). The
significance of the regression model that includes the
proportion of cash crops is just above the five per cent
level, indicating that there is a positive relationship with
suicide rates (model 2). The proportion of indebted
farmers displays a significant positive relationship with
suicide rates (model 3). The percentage of marginal
Table 2 Correlation matrix of main variables
123 4
1. Suicide rate 1
2. Marginal farmers % ·310 1
3. Cash Crops % ·606 -·223 1
4. Indebted farmers % ·610 -·251 ·534 1
Figure 1 The percentage of marginal farmers and suicide rates.
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crops or indebted farmers in the regression equation
(models 4 and 5). When we include marginal farmers,
cash crops, and indebted farmers in the same regression
equation all three variables are significant (model 6).
We would expect an increase of 0·437 in a state’ss u i -
cide rate for every one per cent increase in marginal
farmers, assuming that all other variables in the model
are held constant. A one per cent increase in the per-
centage of cash crops and indebted farmers would re-
spectively result in a 0· 518 and 0 ·549 increase in the
suicide rate. The adjusted R
2 for model 6 indicates
that 74% of the variability in state-level suicide rates is
accounted for by marginal farmers, cash crops, and in-
debted farmers.
We performed a number of tests on the robustness of
model 6. We tested for the possibility that the percentage
of marginal farmers, cash crops, and indebted farmers are
actually proxies for more general state-level characteris-
tics, such as per capita income [17], poverty [18], or in-
equality [19] (see Table 4). These variables have been
shown to be significantly related to other health outcomes
in India [20]. We found that neither per capita income nor
percentage of the population below the poverty line are
significant when included in the regression equation on
their own or alongside the proportion of marginal farmers,
Figure 2 The percentage of crash crops and suicide rates.
Figure 3 The percentage of indebted farmers and suicide rates.
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a significant positive relationship between Gini coefficient
of per capita consumer expenditure and suicide rates: in
other words, suicide rates tend to be higher in states that
are more unequal (model 11). Nevertheless, the relationship
disappears when we control for indebtedness, marginal
farmers, and cash crops (model 12). This demonstrates
that the proportion of marginal farmers, cash crops, and
indebted farmers are better predictors of suicide rates than
inequality.
We also ran the regressions with various alternative
specifications of the dependent variable (see Table 5).
First, we used the same method to calculate the suicide
rates as in the original model, but used figures for the
period 2006 to 2010 (i.e. lagged by five years) (model
13). The model remains similar to the original. Second,
we used the original NCRB data, unadjusted for under-
or over-reporting as identified by Patel et al. (model 14)
[1]. In this model the regression coefficients are lower
because, as we noted above, the unadjusted NCRB figures
underestimate the magnitude of suicide in India [1]. Apart
from the effect size, the results are similar to those we get
when using the adjusted suicide rates.
We then tested whether our results were robust to
changes in the gender composition of the dependent
variable. In the original models we use male suicide rate.
This is because qualitative accounts overwhelmingly
characterise farmers’ suicide as a phenomenon that affects
male farmers who are generally the head of household and
responsible for its economic wellbeing. In the popular im-
agination female suicide tends to be associated with sati–
the act of self-immolation by a widow–or family conflict
over dowries [20]. An analysis of NCRB data suggests that,
in the period 1997–2006, 85 per cent of farmers’ suicides
were by male farmers and that over this period the num-
ber of male farmers’ suicides increased at a rate of 3% per
annum while female farmers’ suicides remained constant
[21]. Nevertheless, it is plausible that farmers’ suicides
involving females are understated in NCRB data because,
although Indian women often do a large proportion of the
agricultural work, they are often not classified as farmers
because the land is not registered in their names [22].
The coefficients were smaller when we used total sui-
cide rate rather than male suicide rate (model 15). This
supports the idea that farmers’ suicide is a phenomenon
that disproportionately affects male farmers. Neverthe-
less, overall the results were largely unaltered with all
three independent variables remaining significant. Model
Table 3 Linear regressions showing the political and
economic determinants of farmers’ suicide, 2001-05
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Marginal farmers % ·252 ·381* ·402* ·437***
(·233) (·123) (·163) (·095)
Cash crops % ·683§ ·801** ·518*
(·355) (·240) (·209)
Indebted farmers % ·670* ·806** ·549*
(·214) (·231) (·187)
Model N 90 90 90 90 90 90
Model F 1.17 3.70 9.83* 13·97*** 6·53* 18·06***
Model adjusted R
2 ·086 ·359 ·365 ·566 ·591 ·741
Notes:- *p< = ·05 (5%), **p< = ·01 (1%), ***p < = ·001 (0.1%), § p= ·071 (7.1%).
Constants calculated but not reported.
Table 4 Linear regressions showing the effects of income, poverty, inequality on farmers’ suicide, 2001-05
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Income ·554 ·051
(·491) (·223)
Poverty -·063 ·233
(·339) (·133)
Inequality ·322* ·092
(.115) (·073)
Marginal farmers % ·441*** ·428*** ·429***
(·099) (.099) (·093)
Cash crops % ·514* ·549* ·448§
(·208) (·205) (·215)
Indebted farmers % ·542* ·571* ·395*
(·189) (·184) (·169)
Model N 90 90 90 90 75 75
Model F 1.27 14·83*** ·03 16·39*** 7.88* 14·12***
Model adjusted R
2 ·038 ·738 ·010 ·757 ·361 ·735
Notes:- *p< = ·05 (5%), **p< = ·01 (1%), ***p < = ·001 (0.1%), § p= ·056 (5.6%). Constants calculated but not reported. For inequality there is no data for Himachal
Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, and the north eastern states.
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able, is different in several respects to the one that uses
male suicide rate (model 6). The percentage of marginal
farmers is significant (p=·009), but the regression coeffi-
cient is half the size of the coefficient in model 6: assum-
ing that all other variables in the model are held
constant we would expect an increase of 0 ·217 in a
state’s female suicide rate for every one per cent increase
in marginal farmers, compared to an increase of 0 ·437
in the male suicide rate. The percentage of cash crops is
a significant predictor of male suicide rate but is not
significant when female suicide rate is the dependent
variable. But the percentage of indebted farmers is a sig-
nificant predictor of both female and male suicide rates.
A one per cent increase in the percentage of indebted
farmers would result in a 0 ·403 and 0· 549 increase in
the female and male suicide rate respectively. The ad-
justed R
2 indicates that model 16 accounts for about
60% of the variability in state-level female suicide rates,
compared to 75% for male suicide rates. These results
suggest that, contrary to perceived wisdom, the structure
of agrarian production does to some extent explain
state-level variation in female suicide rates. Nevertheless,
it is better at explaining male suicide rates–most probably
because men are ultimately responsible for the household’s
economic wellbeing in rural India. This finding suggests
that qualitative studies of farmers’ suicides should not
ignore women. Indeed, more qualitative research is
needed to explain why the proportion of marginal farmers
and indebted farmers are significant predictors of female
suicide but the percentage of cash crops is not.
Table 6 reports two further robustness tests. In model 17
we run the regression without using sandwich estimators
for standard errors: that is, standard errors are not clus-
tered by state to account for the non-independence of
observations from the same state. The standard errors
in this model are, on average, between 2 and 3 times
smaller than when we use a sandwich estimator (model 6).
This might suggest that the error terms do not have con-
stant variance–i.e., they are heteroskedastic. We therefore
undertook a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (which
tests the null hypothesis that the error variances are all
equal versus the alternative that the error variances are
a multiplicative function of one or more variables). The
small and non-significant chi-square value (Χ
2 =0·05,
p=0·83) indicates that heteroskedasticity is not a prob-
lem in our analysis.
Finally, the regression model is more or less unaltered
when we include a calendar year variable to control for
possible changes over time, such as external shocks to
economy (model 18). There were no outliers with stan-
dardized residuals of |2|.
These tests increase our confidence in the finding that
differences in the structure of agricultural production
explain a large amount of inter-state variation in Indian
suicide levels. While this analysis is, due to the availabil-
ity of data, necessarily at a relatively high level of aggre-
gation and only covers a short period of time, our
confidence in these findings is considerably increased by
the large amount of qualitative data that corroborates our
conclusions (see Appendix). There is clearly room for col-
lecting and analysing better quantitative data. More disag-
gregated or survey data would increase our certainty that
the findings are not the result of ecological fallacy, while
time-series data would allow us to test whether there was
a causal relationship between liberalization and suicide, as
Table 5 Linear regressions showing the political and
economic determinants of farmers’ suicide with
alternative specifications of dependent variables,
2001-05
Lagged NCRB All Female
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Marginal farmers % ·406*** ·224** ·327*** ·217*
(·068) (·068) (·062) (·073)
Cash crops % ·449* ·355* ·300* ·077
(·170) (·140) (·128) (·097)
Indebted farmers % ·617** ·259§ ·474*** ·403***
(·179) (·128) (·130) (·090)
Model N 90 90 90 90
Model F 46·93*** 10·79*** 33·96*** 19·16***
Model adjusted R
2 ·800 ·630 ·733 ·596
Notes:- *p< = ·05 (5%), **p< = ·01 (1%), ***p < = ·001 (0.1%), §p= ·060 (6%).
Constants calculated but not reported.
Table 6 Linear regressions showing the political and
economic determinants of farmers’ suicide with
alternative specifications, 2001-05
Without robust SEs Calendar year
(17) (18)
Marginal farmers % ·437*** ·438***
(·046) (·095)
Cash crops % ·518*** ·518*
(·072) (·211)
Indebted farmers % ·549*** ·549*
(·071) (·189)
Calendar year -·087
(·272)
Model N 90 90
Model F 85.66*** 15·25***
Model adjusted R
2 ·741 ·738
Notes:- *p< = ·05 (5%), **p< = ·01 (1%), ***p < = ·001 (0.1%). Constants
calculated but not reported.
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ample, in post-soviet central and eastern Europe [23].
Conclusions
This paper investigated whether differences in the struc-
ture of agricultural production explain inter-state variation
in suicides rates in India. The hypothesis is supported by a
large number of qualitative studies, which argue that the
liberalization of the agricultural sector in the early-1990s
led to an agrarian crisis and that consequently farmers
with certain socioeconomic characteristics–cash crops
cultivators, with marginal landholdings, and debts–are at
particular risk of committing suicide. A recent Lancet
study, however, contends that there is no quantitative evi-
dence to support this hypothesis. We argue that Patel et
al. do not correctly operationalize the mechanism speci-
fied by qualitative research on farmers’ suicides. Our ana-
lysis combined Patel et al.’s state-level suicide estimates
with additional variables to demonstrate that there is a sig-
nificant and positive relationship between the percentage
of marginal farmers and suicide rates, but only when we
control for either or both cash crop production and in-
debted farmers.
Our findings have clear policy implications: they suggest
that if the state were able to reduce the proportion of mar-
ginal farmers, cash crops, or indebted farmers by one per
cent, the suicide rates–suicides per 100,000 per year–
would be reduced by 0·437, 0·518 and 0·549 respect-
ively, when all other variables are held constant. Despite
more than six decades of trying, the majority of Indian
states have been unable to enact meaningful land reforms,
largely because of the strength of the rural elite at the local
level [16]. Thus, while redistribution of land is a desirable
policy prescription, it is perhaps not a realistic one. But
even if the size of landholdings are left untouched, our
analysis indicates that state interventions to stabilize the
price of cash crops and relieve indebted farmers may be
effective at reducing suicide rates in India.
Appendix: summary of literature on farmers’
suicides
Patel et al.’s article only cited one study of farmers’suicides
[1,24]. Nevertheless, there is a large body of research that
explores this phenomenon and provides fascinating “thick”
data on the micro-dynamics of farmers’ suicides. These
studies are predominately published in Indian social
sciences journals, most notably Economic and Political
Weekly. (A significant number of government reports
and newspaper articles–the latter most notably by
Palagummi Sainath–have also informed our under-
standing of farmers’ suicides.) This research forms the
empirical foundation for the hypothesis that suicide
rates will be higher in states where there are more mar-
ginal farmers, where a higher proportion of cash crops
are grown, and where there are is a greater proportion
of indebted farmers.
The vast majority of accounts of farmers’ suicides
focus on one of a few relatively small areas of India: the
Vidarbha region in eastern Maharashtra [24-28], the
plains of Karnataka [29,30], and the Telengana region
of northern Andhra Pradesh [31-34], where farmers’
incomes depend on cotton cultivation; and Wyanad
district and neighbouring areas in Kerala, where coffee
is the major cash crop [35-39].
These studies tend to make very similar assertions re-
garding the causes of farmers’ suicides. First, it is ar-
gued that there is an agrarian crisis in India: “The
increasing incidence of farmers’ suicides is symptom-
atic of a larger crisis, which is much more widespread”
[24]. The agrarian crisis is most often related to the
liberalization of the Indian economy: “the adoption of
the neoliberal model of capitalism by the ruling elite in
India since the early 1990s have led to distinct
aggregate-level institutional and policy changes related
to public investment, input subsidies, organized credit
and external trade” [8]. These changes have increased
the cost of inputs, while the price of produce has either
decreased or become far more volatile. Farmers with
small and marginal landholdings, who cultivate cash
crops such as coffee and cotton, have been particularly
hard hit by these changes.
Cotton cultivation requires relatively large capital ex-
penditure and it is widely argued that these costs have
increased dramatically since the liberalization of the
economy [8,24-34,40,41]. Due to restrictions put in place
by multinational companies, seeds need to be bought
every year. Large quantities of fertilizers and pesticides are
required, and these have become increasingly expensive
due to a reduction in subsidies. In addition, cotton cultiva-
tion is very water intensive, but since the early 1990s the
amount of public money spent on irrigation has fallen and
farmers are increasingly forced to invest in their own sys-
tems. In many cases, cotton cultivators must borrow
money to pay for these capital outlays and this is particu-
larly true for marginal farmers with very few resources.
Explanations of farmers’ suicides in the coffee growing
regions of Kerala are framed in similar terms. But, whereas
accounts of suicide among cotton cultivators tend to focus
on the increasing costs of inputs, analyses of suicides
among coffee farmers concentrate on the decreasing price
paid for the produce [8,35-39]. In 2006, for example, the
price of coffee was Rs.24 ($0.4) a kilo, whereas it had been
more than Rs.130 ($2.2) a kilo a few years previously [8].
This is blamed on the purchasing power of multinational
companies who continue to sell the end product at a high
price. Falling prices have had a disastrous effect on the
livelihoods of 60,000 or so farmers who cultivate coffee on
about 70,000 hectares of plantations in Wayanad.
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http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/10/1/16Indebtedness, as one account points out, is the “pro-
verbial last straw” in the causal chain [28]: “The build-up
of farmer debt is a direct result of the deepening agrarian
crisis, and the wave of farmer suicides is a direct outcome
of mounting debt” [8]. A study of the Vidarbha region in
Western Maharashtra found that out of 111 cases of
farmers’ suicide, 96 (87%) of the families interviewed cited
indebtedness as an important reason for their relative’s
suicide [24,25]. Debt makes marginal farmers extremely
vulnerable to disruptions such as illness or crop failure as
a result of extreme weather or pests. Some observers have
suggested that the introduction of genetically modified
varieties of crops since liberalization has considerably
worsened the situation: the cultivation of such crops is
“ecologically vulnerable since it is based on monoculture
of introduced varieties and on non-sustainable practices of
chemically intensive farming” [42].
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